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The essays by Cooter' and by Viton and Winston 2 criticize
and elaborate on aspects of our Article published previously in
this Review.3 Both essays contain interesting points that are technically correct. Neither warrants any substantive change in our
analysis of passing on, in our policy conclusions, or in the techniques for adjudicating passing-on issues described in our Article.
REPLY TO PROFESSOR COOTER

In any situation in which passing on would be an issue, the
direct purchaser is, by economic definition, buying a "factor input,"
not a "final product." Because of this, Professor Cooter argues,
4
both the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois
and our Article were incorrect in using a version of tax incidence
theory that does not account directly for factor "substitution to
estimate the extent of passing on. But given our goal of developing
a workable policy for litigation in markets in which significant
monopoly overcharges are actually encountered, the scant attention
paid to factor substitution is all that the topic deserves. For two
reasons, we remain convinced that "[t]he possibility of significant
factor substitution by [direct purchasers] . . . implies an elastic
demand curve between [the manufacturer and direct purchasers]
.... ,in which case monopolistic pricing is highly improbable.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that factor substitution is relatively low in passing-on cases."
f Assistant Professor of Business Administration, University-of California, Berkeley. B.A. 1965, M.A. 1973, Michigan State University; Ph.D. 1977, University of
California, Berkeley.
f Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California, Berkeley.
A.B. 1948, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1951, Harvard University.
I Cooter, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Further Comment on
Economic Theory, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1523 (1981).
2 Viton & Winston, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: The Welfare Implications, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1516 (1981).
3 Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A, Comprehensive
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979).
4431 U.S. 720 (1977).
5 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 292 n.59.
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The first reason factor substitution is less significant than Pro-fessor Cooter argues concerns the way managerial decisions are
made. Cooter employs a version of neoclassical production theory
that assumes: (1) that manufacturers face an infinite array of choices
regarding the combination of inputs in producing any particular
output; (2) that manufacturers have constant and costless access to
all information about all these alternatives, and (3) that managers
constantly minimize production costs by extremely fine and continuous adjustments of factor inputs as relative factor prices change.6
If these assumptions were accurate, factor substitution would costlessly and effortlessly occur as soon as a monopolist or a cartel
raised prices. Thus, not only would the passing-on problem
be greatly diminished, but also the problem of monopoly overcharges itself would be much alleviated.
Professor Cooter's assumptions about managerial behavior,
however, do not conform to reality. Herbert Simon's behaviorial
model of the firm is much closer to the truth (though admittedly
less susceptible to elegant mathematical techniques). 7 Managers
may well face a vast array of possible combinations of inputs. But
they are constrained by limited time, limited information, limited
energy, and limited mental capacity. Consequently, they are limited-and deliberately limit themselves-in their range of choices.
Input combinations are seldom reinvestigated, let alone changed,
unless some substantialperturbation thrusts the input question onto
the agenda for managerial attention. Even then, managers gather
and evaluate only information that is reasonably accessible. Moreover, there is always inertial pressure against making any change
that will alter purchasing relationships unless the change promises
a substantial cost reduction that appears likely to continue for a
significant period of time.
The second reason that input substitution is less significant
than Professor Cooter presumes concerns technological limitations.8
In his analysis, Cooter compares his model of perfect substitutability
to only the most restrictive example of limited factor substitutability-namely, fixed factor proportions (when there is one, and only
one, technologically feasible proportion of inputs). More complex,
and probably more frequent, are the intermediate cases in which
6These assumptions are embodied in the smooth, curved line in Cooter's Figure
4. See Cooter, stipra note 1, at 1528.
7See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 299-303, 301 n.70.
8

Tndeed, although technological limitations on factor substitution are logically

separable from limitations rooted in managerial behavior, the two are not mutually
exclusive. Technological limitations may bound a zone within which managers do
not consider changing input factor proportions.
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some substitutability, but not an unlimited amount, is possible. As
shown in our Figure 1, this condition of limited substitutability is
not represented by a smooth curve like that in Professor Cooter's
Figure 4, but has "kinks" (that is, the curve is not continuously
differentiable).9
FIGURE 1
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In these circumstances, small changes in relative factor prices
might have no effect on the least-cost factor proportions. If, for
example, the relative prices of factors X and Y were those presented
by the price P1, then the cost-minimizing factor proportion is represented by the intersection Q, Q . Suppose now that the producers
of factor Y cartelize and increase their price to a supracompetitive
level-this price shift is represented by price line P.. Nevertheless,
Q Q, remains the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. Only'
a very large shift in the relative prices of X and Y would make it
9 For a complete economic analysis of production theory, see W. BAumox, Eco(4th ed. 1977) (especially cl. 12).
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rational for the firm to change its factor proportions (to, say
Qd, Q,). Thus, small price changes have no effect on factor proportions, whereas a substantial change in relative prices can have
a correspondingly large effect on the quantity of X and Y purchased.
This analysis brings us to the point made in our Article and
the reason why factor substitutability was relegated to a footnote.10
Given both the behavioral limits of managerial decisionmaking and
the technological limits on factor substitutability, only a significant
change in relative factor prices is likely to induce factor substitution. But potential price fixers (or other overchargers) are as likely,
or more likely, than are their customers to have information about
these limits. In these circumstances, as noted in our original footnote, price fixers are not likely to raise prices to the point at which
they would suffer large output losses owing to factor substitution
by direct purchasers.'
We do not suggest that factor substitutability should be ignored in passing-on litigation. As Professor Cooter suggests, it
would be a relatively straightforward exercise for a court to determine whether a significant degree of factor substitution had actually occurred. If it had, the burden imposed on final consumers
would be reduced. But even then (as Professor Cooter agrees) the
final consumers-not the direct purchasers-would bear the burden.
Thus, Professor Cooter's essay impeaches neither our assertion that
indirect purchasers should have the opportunity to prove and recover their losses nor the method we described for determining
what portion of the total overcharge is allocable to purchasers at
each vertical stage.
REPLY TO PROFESSORS VrroN AND WINSTON

Although our Article extends and supplements price theory

with behavioral and institutional considerations, it is nonetheless
true, as Professors Viton and Winston say, that our analysis is "partial." We assumed that courts hearing passing-on cases would
examine only one vertical distribution chain and would ignore
possible imperfections in related markets. We did not assume that a
10 See Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 292 n.59.
11 To confirm our claim that factor substitutability is not frequently an important
issue, we reviewed the economic facts in the sixty-five recent price fixing cases
summarized in the Appendix accompanying our Article. Id. 355-60. Although
lacking in the information needed to make precise determinations, it is readily apparent that factor substitutability would have occurred in very few of these cases.
Further, we are of the opinion that factor substitutability was unimportant or nonexistent in all of the twenty-eight cases in which we ascribed the rate of passing on
as "high."
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court in an antitrust case should try to deal with the whole economy
or any larger portion of it than the market in which the challenged
trade restraint applies. 2
If one assumes that all markets in the economy, save one, are
either perfectly competitive or subject only to mutually offsetting
distortions, Professors Viton and Winston are correct in noting that
imposition of an "overcharge" in one of the competitive markets
might actually improve allocative efficiency (that is, "welfare," as
they use that term) because the newly imposed overcharge might
"correct" for the defect in the one noncompetitive market. Given
the interdependence of markets, one can picture a situation in
which two "wrongs" might make a "right," or might at least be
better than one "wrong." In the specific example offered by Professors Viton and Winston, that of unregulated trucking versus
regulated railroad service, if all other markets are assumed to be
competitive, allocative efficiency might be improved by motor carrier prices in excess of marginal costs.' s
It is a considerable leap, however, to argue from that single
two-market example, that the Illinois Brick decision might as a rule
(that is, over a number of cases), produce results that are economically superior to the results implied by our analysis. There are
two main reasons why we challenge that position.
First, there is a matter of economics: If one accepts the restrictive, value-laden assumptions embodied in neoclassical theory (or,
for that matter, in any system of economic thought), it is possible
to logically prove certain results. For example, if one assumes,
inter alia, that the prices of all other products are equal to their
marginal social cost of production, one can prove that allocative
efficiency would be increased if the price of the product under
analysis were also equal to its marginal social cost of production.
If the assumption about the prices of other products were not true
(and, of course, those required assumptions never are true), economic theory simply cannot prove at what price the analyzed prod12 There is a long tradition of "general analysis" in theoretical economics which,
purportedly, incorporates all economic action and activities simultaneously. Analysis
of this kind requires an extraordinarily high level of abstraction and highly restrictive
assumptions regarding the technical and behavioral characteristics of an economy.
Consequently, it is seldom used in policy related analyses. The law characteristically
deals in particularities and mid-level generalizations and rarely, if ever, attempts a
sweeping, general analysis of economic or equity issues. So far as we are aware, no
antitrust court has ever attempted a general analysis.
18 A similar problem of "second-best"-involving the same two industries-was
emphasized in an analysis of railroad regulatory policy toward branch line abandonments. See R. Harris, Simple Analytics of Rail Costs and Disinvestment Criteria,
Transportation Research Record No. 687, at 19 (1978).
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uct must sell to maximize allocative efficiency. This is known as
the problem of "second best," and the thrust of the Viton-Winston
essay is that we have ignored it.
Far from ignoring the second-best dilemma, each of us has
elsewhere cited it as a major reason why policy cannot be based
solely on, and why caution is essential regarding the results of,
economic theory.14 Our disagreement with Professors Viton and
Winston does not concern the existence of the dilemma, but rather
what to do about it. They treat allocative efficiency-a general
equilibrium condition-as the sole goal of antitrust law. Yet, they
apparently think second-best problems can be solved by looking
only at one or two markets adjacent to that in which an antitrust
restraint arises. If those markets are all competitive, presumably
Viton and Winston would have the court apply antitrust principles
to try to make the restrained market more competitive, assuming
that this would bring the economy as a whole closer to allocative
efficiency. In such an instance, we infer, they would allow indirect
purchasers to sue for monopoly overcharges. If, however, one or
more adjacent markets is not competitive, Professors Viton and
Winston presumably would have the court countenance monopolization or cartelization in the restrained market.15
We are persuaded, by contrast, that second-best problems actually make it infeasible to use allocative efficiency as the basic
goal of antitrust policy.' 6 The second-best problem is not the danger that an antitrust correction in one market is likely to yield a
global loss in allocative efficiency. The problem, rather, is that
there exists no theoretical or empirical basis for drawing any inference about what effect a correction in one market will have on
allocative efficiency. An antitrust action may result in a closer
relationship between price and costs in a particular market. But if
one specifies allocative efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust (as
Viton and Winston implicitly do), one must judge every antitrust
law suit by asking whether it moves the entire economy closer to
' 4 See, e.g., L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF
LAW OF Ai.rrrrTUST 2-7 (1977);
Harris, Deregulation: Panacea or Reform, Working Paper of the Center for Transportation Policy and Research, Berkeley (presented to Midwest Economic Association
in 1980) (on file with author).
15 The implication of their essay is that in such circumstances indirect purchasers
should not have a damage action to recover the amount of an overcharge passed on
to them. They do not make clear whether they would allow a damage action to
the direct purchaser, or would allow the government to enjoin or criminally punish
the violation. The logic of their position would appear to preclude any enforcement
against cartelists in cases in which adjacent markets are not competitive.
16 See note 14 supra.
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that highly particularized condition of system-wide equilibrium.
An answer to that question will never be available.
A single market correction would move in the direction of
improving system-wide allocative efficiency only if: (1) all other
markets could be held unchanged while one was corrected (a theoretical impossibility); or (2) the ramifications of the correction in
the single market could be traced sufficiently far to warrant a confident judgment that, on balance, the system-wide effect was in the
correct direction (an empirical improbability). Candid and realistic
practitioners of both law and economics must concede that the day
when courts and juries will be capable of doing or comprehending
analyses so complex and far reaching is a long way off. For that
matter, we are still a good distance from the day when economic
theorists are able to carry out such an analysis in a rigorous manner.
Certainly, Professors Viton and Winston have not done it in their
hypothetical two-market example. Simply noting that the ultimate
system-wide impacts of any given correction turn on the strength
of interdependence does not put us in possession of the analytic
technology that would enable us to use antitrust to move the
economy, as a whole, closer to a state of allocatively efficient
equilibrium.
Consequently, we take issue with Professors Viton and Winston's implication that allocative efficiency is the sole measure for
comparing antitrust policies. Our reading of legal history suggests
that "dread of enhancement of prices," '1 a concern about shifting
income from consumers to monopolists and cartelists, not allocative
efficiency, is the basic economic goal of antitrust. s This, unlike
allocative efficiency, is a goal that does not depend on economy-wide
effects and that can be advanced in one market at a time.' 9
17 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Is See L. Sur.zavr, supra note 14, at 2-8.
19 But see Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions, 128 U. PA. L.
REv. 953, 985-88 (1979), which also criticized the view that we are expressing here.

Without making any attempt to show that it would be feasible to do a general
analysis in an antitrust case, Williamson appears to rely on the theoretically and
empirically unfounded assumption that any improvement in price-cost relationships
in a single market will tend to improve allocative efficiency economy-wide. In effect,
Williamson shifts the burden of proof and challenges those who think second-best
problems may seriously interfere with the prospect of increasing allocative efficiency
through antitrust to prove him wrong. Because both Williamson and we start by
supporting antitrust enforcement in any market in which a restraint reduces output,
it may appear that there is no practical difference between his view and ours. The
logic of Williamson's position, however, would require that he back away from
antitrust enforcement on facts like those in the Viton-Winston transportation market
hypothetical, where the evidence, so far as traced, suggests that allocative efficiency
is not being served. Because we identify the goal of the law as foreclosing wealth
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By emphasizing the "welfare triangle" in their Figure 1 20 (a
graphical measure of the "deadweight" loss due to allocative inefficiency), Professors Viton and Winston fail to acknowledge the
distributionalconsequences of their hypothetical mark-up of motor
carrier price above marginal cost. Their own graph shows-but
they fail to mention-an income transfer from the users to the producers of motor carrier services in an amount equal to the rectangle
to the left of triangle B. This "distributional rectangle" is nevertheless-in their example and in virtually all real cases-considerably larger than the "efficiency triangle." Professors Viton and
Winston, like most economists, ignore it. Antitrust law, and our
analysis, does not.
transfers from consumers to monopolists or cartelists, we support enforcement in all
instances in which output is restricted by supracompetitive pricing.
20
Viton & Winston, supranote 2, at 1520.

